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Professor A. Peter Mutharika, one of Professor Dorsey's colleagues at
Washington University School of Law, is the founder and first President of
the International Third World Legal Studies Association (ITWLSA).
ITWLSA has been particularly sensitive to the need to base national devel-
opment upon authentic cultural values. However, Third World states
must face the realities of a world economy. Professor Kohona of the Legal
and Counsular Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trades
of Australia is one of ITWLSA's most active members. Professor Kohona
theorizes that Third World state are increasingly bound by rules of inter-
national law arising out of economic treaties. These rules significantly re-
strict the economic sovereignty of Third World States.
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS WITHIN
MUNICIPAL LEGAL SYSTEMS
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
PALITHA T.B. KOHONA*
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Increased Regulation of International Economic Relations
Julius Stone stated in 1954 that, "one modem year's international leg-
islation, that is State agreed regulation of new problems by multilateral
instruments, exceeds that of a whole century of old."'
This statement is more relevant today as the international community
concludes an ever increasing number of agreements, both bilateral and
multilateral, with a view to regulating various aspects of international
relations through commonly accepted norms. This statement is particu-
larly pertinent in the area of international economic relations.
Many factors have contributed to encouraging the perceived need for
the international regulation of aspects of economic relations among
* LL.B (Hons) (Sri Lanka); LL.M. (A.N.U.); Ph.D. (Cantab); Presently attached to the Legal
and Consular Division of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia. The views
expressed in this paper should not be attributed to the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
1. STONE, LEGAL CONTROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICr 23 (1954).
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countries.2 Some of the major contributory factors include: the increas-
ing frequency and intensity of contact and interaction among peoples
that modem inventions and technology made possible, the rapid diffusion
and unification of material culture, the rising unity of demand among
peoples everywhere for wider participation in the production and sharing
of all values, the very expanding economic relations among countries and
the repeated economic crises, the increasing recognition by peoples of
their interdependence and common interests, and the growing under-
standing of the increasing role of law in sharing demanded values and
material benefits.
B. Methods of Regulation and the Resulting Legal Regimes
The most significant method of regulation of international economic
relations has been through the conclusion of multilateral agreements. In
addition, a variety of international institutions have been established for
this purpose. These institutions have been given an extensive range of
functions for achieving their objectives, including legislative, executive
and even judicial functions. Consequently, they are becoming an impor-
tant source of international law, as the regulatory measures established in
the pursuit of their goals increase in number. In addition, the activities
of the above institutions, at times, influence the slowly developing rules
of international custom relating to international economic relations.3
The 1960s and 1970s witnessed a massive growth in the number of
such international norms relating to economic relations. This growth
may have reflected the prevailing mood that supported international joint
action to deal with various economic problems. The enthusiasm for such
international regulatory norms has diminished somewhat in the 1980s
due to changed political and social perspectives. Nevertheless, today an
enormous web of international economic norms and a variety of interna-
tional economic regimes exist, which are expanding continuously. These
regimes cover inter alia, civil aviation, shipping, road transportation, la-
bor relations, exchange transactions, credit facilities, tariffs, agriculture,
2. See Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen 56 A.L.J.R. 625, 636 (1982); Akinsanya & Davies, Third
World Quest for a New International Economic Order: An Overview, 33 I.C.L.Q. 208 (1984).
3. See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, I.C.J. Rep. 41 (1969); SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA CON-
VENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 22 (2d ed. 1984); Wigdor, Canada and the New International
Economic Order: Some Legal Implications, XX CAN. Y. INT'L. L.L. 161, 191 (1982); see also Soren-
sen, Autonomous Legal Orders; Some Considerations Relating to Systems Analysis of International
Organisations in the World Order, 32 I.C.L.Q. 559 (1982).
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the exploitation of the resources of the sea, production and sale of com-
modities, trade marks, intellectual property, trade competition, bills of
exchange and the resolution of disputes relating to economic relations.
4
C. Effects of this Development on Individual States
A significant aspect of the expansion of international economic re-
gimes has been the slow decline of the sovereign powers of nation states
over economic matters. Countries that in the past have been jealously
protective of their sovereign powers over their economies and their eco-
nomic relations with each other, have cautiously, but deliberately moved
in the direction of voluntarily restricting some of these powers or even
surrendering them in the interest of the common good.
A related development has been the acquisition by individual states of
an increased role in molding the expanding web of international regula-
tory norms. Thus, while states are slowly losing their powers of control
over their own economies, they are also beginning to play an increasing
role in the evolving international power systems, particularly those relat-
ing to economic matters.
D. The Obligation to Implement International Norms
Normally, a state would enter into an international agreement volunta-
rily, following detailed negotiations, and after working out various com-
promises and trade-offs. Once a particular compact has been agreed to
internationally, international law requires the state to take all necessary
measures to give due effect to the provisions of such a compact. Article
26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties5 obliges parties to
treaties to perform their commitments in good faith. Article 13 of the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States states
"Every State has the duty to carry out in good faith its obligations arising
from treaties and other sources of international law, and it may not in-
voke provisions in its constitution or its laws as an excuse for failure to
perform this duty. ' ' 6 Some international agreements contain specific pro-
4. Morgenstern, International Legislation at the Crossroads, 49 B.Y.B.I.L. 101 (1978);
KOHONA, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS THROUGH LAW, Ch. 3
(1985); McRae and Thomas, The GATTand the Multilateral Treaty Making: The Tokyo Round, 77
AM. J. INT'L L. 51 (1983).
5. Aust. T.S. 1974, No.2.
6. See also Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations P.C.I.J. Series B No. 10, 20 (1925).
[Vol. 65:842
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visions requiring the parties to give effect to them within their domestic
jurisdictions.
In addition to the legal obligation, there could be practical imperatives
compelling a state to comply with its international treaty obligations.
Considering that a state would enter into a treaty only after carefully
balancing benefits and concessions, non-compliance with its obligations
could result in the other parties denying the benefits under the treaty to
that party if the party did not comply with its requirements in good faith.
Therefore there are both legal and practical reasons for a state to comply
with its international commitments.
The obligation to comply with international economic norms would
relate not only to the original agreements themselves, but to the subse-
quent norms of conduct that are adopted by the organizations established
under them. It has been said that:
unless otherwise provided in the treaty itself, a state can not justify its fail-
ure to perform its obligations under a treaty because of any provision or
omissions of its municipal law, or because of any special features of its gov-
ernmental organization or its constitutional system.7
E. Implementation with Domestic Jurisdictions
A state which accepts an international economic commitment would
be required to give effect to it both internationally and within its domes-
tic jurisdiction. Due to their very nature, international economic norms
are required to be implemented in detail within domestic jurisdictions if
they are to be fully effective. For example, an agreement like the Interna-
tional Coffee Agreement which requires its parties, inter alia, to regulate
the production and marketing of coffee would be rendered ineffective un-
less carefully implemented within the domestic jurisdictions of the coffee
producing countries. This requirement involves the enactment of de-
tailed laws relating to the production and disposal of coffee - thus, inev-
itably affecting the lives and livelihood of hundreds and thousands of
individual persons and juridical personalities as well as various domestic
laws, regulations, customs and practices.
F Effects of the Growth of International Economic Norms
This paper will briefly examine the slow decline of the powers of the
7. Harvard Research Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. (Supp.)
1029 (1935); see also Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 27 (1969).
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individual states in relation to economic matters and the corresponding
growth of international economic norms, and the effects of the role
played by individual states in the evolving international power systems.
It will be seen that the growing web of international economic norms is
influenced by, and at the same time reflects, the aims and aspirations of
the principal participants of the world power processes, namely, the
states themselves, individuals, political parties, trade unions and other
pressure groups. Furthermore, it will be seen that due to the necessity to
implement international economic norms within domestic jurisdictions
to make them fully effective, there is an increasing interdependence be-
tween the effectiveness of international economic norms internationally,
and their implementation within municipal jurisdictions. In most cases
this interdependence is so proximate that failure to implement an inter-
national economic norm within the municipal legal system of a relevant
state could render such a norm ineffective internationally in relation to
that state, and in some cases, as all states parties as well. The implica-
tions of this for both domestic law and international law is significant.
II. THE CONCEPT OF STATE SOVEREIGNTY IN RELATION TO
ECONOMIC MATTERS
Historically, the growth of the powers of the nation state also resulted
in the evolution of the concept of unlimited sovereignty. This idea, first
developed to justify and explain unlimited internal freedom of action of
the nation state, was later extended to justify unlimited external freedom
of action.8 In relation to economic matters, it meant that the state could
enjoy an unfettered freedom of action, both internally and externally.
Thomas Jefferson observed that, "every [state] may govern itself accord-
ing to whatever form it pleases, and change these forms at its own will." 9
More recently, the United Nations resolved that, "Every state has the
right ... to exercise freely, without dictation by any other state, all its
legal povwers, including the choice of its own form of government." 10
Even historically, however, there were certain limitations on this abso-
8. See Report of the Study Group on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, David
Davis Memorial Institute of International Studies 55 (1966).
9. HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 177-78 (1940).
10. Art. 1, Annex to UN Gen. Ass. Res. No. 375 (IV), UN Gen. Ass. Off. Rec. 4th Sess.
Resolutions, at 67 (1949).
[Vol. 65:842
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lute freedom of economic action which states claimed."'
The idea of sovereignty of the state in relation to economic matters
was closely associated with its economic well-being, and hence it was
only natural that this concept should have been tenaciously adhered to.
A state's ability to control its own currency in a manner that it saw fit
was considered to be an essential element of the state's economic sover-
eignty. The Permanent Court of International Justice Cases (PCIJ) ob-
served that: "It is indeed a generally accepted principle that a State is
entitled to regulate its own currency."' 2
Municipal courts readily upheld this position. In the past, an English
Court has granted an injunction to prevent the printing of counterfeit
currency in England for the purpose of circulation in the Austro-Hun-
garian Empire. Lord Justice Knight-Bruce stated:
..... the preparation here 13 without and against the plaintiff's consent of
such documents as these, with the intention of issuing and using them in
Hungary without and against his consent, was and is by the law of England,
was and is by the law of nations, wrongful ..... when I use the term
'wrongful' I mean civily 'unlawful' as regards rights of property, that is to
say, the public revenues, the fiscal resources, the pecuniary means of the
realm of Hungary .... 14
Lord Justice Turnour observed:
I think it is an injury not to the political but to the private rights of the
plaintiff's subjects ..... that the effect of this introduction (of spurious
notes into Hungary) will be to disturb the circulation of currency in the
Kingdom cannot, in my opinion, be doubted; and what will be the effect of
the disturbance? Surely to endanger, to prejudice and to deteriorate the
value of the existing circulating medium, and thus to affect directly all the
holders of Austrian bank notes and indirectly if not directly all the holders
of property in the State. 5
It is interesting to note that any interference in the right of Hungary to
control its own currency was considered to be an infringement against
the rights, not only of the State of Hungary, but also of the subjects of the
11. The right of the Spaniards and the Portuguese to occupy and exploit newly discovered
territories was divided between the two nations by a line drawn through the Azores by Papal Order.
There were also international compacts which imposed limitations on the economic activities of
states. See WILD, SANCTIONS AND TREATY ENFORCEMENT, 180 et seq (1934).
12. Serbian and Brazilian Loans Cases, Series A, Nos. 20 and 21, 44 (1929).
13. The reference is to Britain.
14. Emperor of Austria v. Day and Kossuth 3 de G.F. and J. 217 at 247 (1861).
15. Id. at 243.
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State. 16
The economic sovereignty of the state permitted it to regulate to its
own advantage, and to the exclusion of other states, all other aspects of
economic activity.
As observed by Muir:
That the regulation of foreign trade is normally a right within the sovereign
prerogatives of an independent country is too well established to permit
disagreement in the context of existing international law. Individual na-
tions have historically regulated imports by imposing tariffs, inspections,
quantitative and qualitative restrictions, and numerous other conditions
and barriers on international trade. They have frequently regulated exports
as well, including, recently, complete cut-offs were deemed necessary to re-
tain adequate domestic supply without inflation.17
The extent to which and the jealousy with which states protected their
economic sovereignty is illustrated by the attitude of Britain, (which was
certainly not in a strong bargaining position due to its war ravaged econ-
omy) at the Bretton Woods Conference, and at the subsequent negotia-
tions with the United States to obtain assistance to resuscitate its
economy. 1'
A majority of the Directors of the Bank of England are opposed to the
Bretton Woods program .... It is argued by those in opposition that if the
plan is adopted financial control will leave London and Sterling exchange
will be replaced by Dollar exchange. Right Wing Conservatives such as
Amery .... who represents Imperial thinking in the Cabinet are disturbed
by this argument.19
In brief, it may be said that the concept of state sovereignty in relation
to economic matters, as it prevailed, was extensive, and states tended to
cling on to it even in the worst of times.
III. THE CHANGING CONCEPT OF ECONOMIC SOVEREIGNTY
Slowly it became apparent that the individualist and "beggar they
neighbor" policies of the past were, in the long run, detrimental to the
interests of the world community at large. Over a period of time, a grow-
16. In 1920, 20 states ratified the Convention for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency.
Significantly, the U.S.A., U.K., and France were not party to this.
17. Muir, The Boycott in International Law 9 J.I.L. & E. 187, 192 (1974). Muir's views may be
said to reflect the traditional concept of the State's economic sovereignty.
18. See GARDENER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY (1956).
19. The telegram from Ambassador Winnant to the Secretary of State (April 12, 1944) (White
Papers).
[Vol. 65:842
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ing tendency developed among states to embark on cooperative ventures
in economic matters, to attain common economic objectives. This ten-
dency is evidenced by the numerous multilateral economic agreements
concluded and the resulting international economic regimes. A neces-
sary casualty of this development was the concept that the state pos-
sessed an unbridled power over its own economy, a concept which has
undergone modification to suit the requirements of an altered
environment.
It has been observed that:
While the pretension of national sovereignty continues to be jealously pre-
served and loudly proclaimed by statesmen at every national and interna-
tional platform its reality is subtly melting away under the inexorable
pressures of guarding its very existence.2°
Though this reference is to the surrender of some aspects of sovereignty,
as a consequence of entering into military arrangements, it is equally ap-
plicable to situations where states enter into international agreements of
an economic nature.21 With every new international economic norm of
conduct that is adopted, some further aspect of international economic
activity begins to be regulated internationally, and the individual state's
powers of control over economic matters is reduced to some extent.
A. Restrictions on the Economic Sovereignty of States
Fawcett, writing on the International Monetary Fund (IMF), says that
states now recognize that curtailing their power to impose trade restric-
tions benefits trade. He also suggests that a duty not to cause economic
harm to other states'has come to be recognized at the same time.22
The prohibition of unfair competition can be regarded as a general principle
of law to be found in the municipal law of many countries. It has also had
international recognition in the 'open door' system of the General Act of
Berlin, 1885, and in the mandates and trusteeship agreements, and has now
been embodied in the E.E.C. Treaty as a central feature. Further it has had
20. Ahoja-Patel, Economic Cooperation in Africa 3 J.W.T.L. 251, 256 (1969). A resurgence of
economic nationalism in recent times has been caused by the downturn of the international economy
and its impact on national economies. See recent amendments to the Trade Act 1974, 88 Stat. 1978,
19 U.S.C.; § 2101 (1982).
21. It could be suggested that states agree to surrender a part of their sovereignty because they
have the prospect of becoming part of an international power system in the process.
22. It is difficult to assert categorically that an international rule of law to this effect has come
to be recognized. Fawcett, The International Monetary Fund and International Law, 40 B.Y.B.I.L.,
32, 57 (1964).
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a particular application in the field of state trading. But the concepts of
unfair competition and discrimination are not always distinguished, for
while a State may create conditions of major trade competition in favor of
its own agencies, this may not necessarily discriminate against other states
or their nationals, since the basis and aim of major competition and dis-
crimination may be different. 23
It is noted that under the provisions of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) contracting parties have agreed to the com-
mon objective of substantially reducing barriers to trade through a pro-
cess of consultation and negotiation.24 The IMF Agreement takes away
the absolute regulatory power which states possessed in relation to their
own currencies.25
B. Restrictions on Discrimination
Some multilateral trade agreements have sought to eliminate discrimi-
natory trade practices among member parties, in order to liberalize inter-
national trade. For example, Article 6(l)(a) of the Convention
Establishing the [European Free Trade Association] EFTA states:
Member States shall not:
(a) apply directly or indirectly to imported goods any fiscal charge in ex-
cess of those applied directly or indirectly to like domestic goods, nor apply
such charges so as to afford effective protection to like domestic goods.
Similarly, Article 13 paragraph l(a) states:
Member States shall not maintain or introduce:
(a) the forms of aid to exports of goods to other Member States which are
described in Annex C.
Paragraph l(b) states:
Member States shall not maintain or introduce:
(b) any other form of aid, the main purpose or effect of which is to frus-
trate the benefits expected from the removal or absence of duties and quan-
titative restrictions on trade between Member States.
The Montevideo Treaty and the Carribean Community (CARICOM)
Treaty contain similar provisions.26 Such treaties have the effect of curb-
ing the unrestricted right of the individual state to encourage the growth
and assist and protect local industries and to foster exports through dis-
23. Id at 57.
24. See Preamble, The GATT.
25. This is the objective of the IMF Agreement.
26. Montevideo Treaty, art. 17, arts. 21 and 22, and the Treaty establishing the CARICOM,
[Vol. 65:842
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criminatory laws and policies. Commodity agreements also impose strin-
gent regulatory measures on their member states' unlimited right to
produce and market commodities.27
C. Requirement to Consult on Economic Matters
Under some international economic agreements, states have volunta-
rily agreed to act in consultation with each other on specified economic
matters. Under the GATT, contracting parties are required to consult
each other extensively on matters relating to tariffs and other trade re-
strictions. The General Treaty of Central American Economic Integra-
tion (GTCAEI) also states:
In the event of monopolies being created or the regime governing existing
ones being modified, consultations shall take place among the Parties with
the aim of Providing special rules for Central American trade in the corre-
sponding articles.28
With the acceptance of the need to consult each other on specified mat-
ters, parties to such agreements forego the right which they enjoyed pre-
viously to act unilaterally (and at times, selfishly). This restriction would
also ensure, to an extent, that any action an individual state might take
would reflect, to some extent, the needs of all interested parties.29
D. Requirement to Take Positive Action Within Municipal
Jurisdictions
In addition to agreeing to restrict or forego their right to take unilat-
eral action internationally regarding the matters covered by international
economic agreements, states could also agree to institute positive legisla-
tive and executive measures within their own municipal jurisdictions to
give effect to such agreements. For example, Article 46 of the Interna-
tional Sugar Agreement (1977) states:
1. Members undertake to adopt such measures as are necessary to enable
them to fulfill their obligations under this Agreement and fully to co-oper-
ate with one another in securing the attainment of the objectives of this
Agreement.
27. These regulatory measures cover the right to produce, stockpile, market, etc.
28. GTCAEI, art. VIII.
29. In the Peace Corp's Agreements, the U.S.A. and the beneficiary states agree to "fully in-
form, consult and cooperate with the representatives of the Government of the United States with
respect to all matters concerning Peace Corps volunteers." See also, International Olive-Oil Agree-
ment, art. 14 (1963). However, it is noted that there has been a resurgence of self-interested eco-
nomic actions by states in recent times.
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2. Importing Members undertake to ensure that, except as provided for in
Article 38, and in respect of sugar en admission temporaire, their total ex-
ports of sugar not exceed their total imports of sugar in the same quota
year.30
Under Article 35(1) of the International Cocoa Agreement (1975):
Members shall adopt the measures required to ensure full compliance with
the obligations undertaken by them in this Agreement in respect of export
quotas. The Council may call upon members to adopt additional measures,
if necessary, for the effective implementation of the export quota system,,
including the making of regulations by exporting members providing for
the registration of all their cocoa to be exported within the limit of the
export quota in effect.
Such an obligation may relate to the area directly within the legislative
competence of the central government. Under Article 5 of the Treaty
Establishing the CARICOM:3' ". . .[Member States] shall facilitate the
achievement of the objectives of the Common Market. They shall ab-
stain from any measures which could jeopardize the attainment of the
objectives of the Common Market." This provision casts a positive obli-
gation on member states to take steps to attain the objectives of the Com-
mon Market which would include the enactment of appropriate
legislation and administrative regulations. This provision also casts a
negative obligation not to take any measures that would hinder the at-
tainment of the objectives of the Common Market.
The Convention Establishing the European Free Trade Association
(EFTA)32 acknowledges the problems that may arise in connection with
the above requirements in federal states, and the EFTA contains a much
less stringent provision. Paragraph 4 of Article 14 of the EFTA states:
Where member-states do not have the necessary legal powers to control the
activities of regional or local government authorities or enterprises under
their control in these matters, they shall nevertheless endeavor to ensure
that those authorities or enterprises comply with the provisions of the
Article.
Similarly, under Article XXIV(12) of the GATT:
Each contracting party shall take such reasonable measures as may be
available to it to ensure observance of the provisions of this Agreement by
the regional and local governments and authorities within this territory.
Provisions of this type take into account the limits of the powers of cen-
30. See also International Olive-Oil Agreement, art. 14 (1963).
31. See also The Annex to the CARICOM Treaty, art. 4.
32. EFTA Agreement, art. 14, para 4.
[Vol. 65:842
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tral governments in federal states.3 3
The obligation, incurred under an international agreement to bring a
state party's internal laws into line with the provisions of the agreement,
may require the modification and even the repeal of already existing mu-
nicipal laws. Article 42 of the Annex to the CARICOM Treaty states
that:
Member States recognize the desirability to harmonize as soon as practica-
ble such provisions as imposed by law or administrative practices as effect
the establishment and operation of the Common Market in the following
areas: - (a list of the areas follows).
Necessary directives for this purpose may issue from the international
institutions established under an international economic agreement. Ar-
ticle 100 of the European Economic Communities (EEC) Treaty states
that:
The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission
issue directives for the approximation of such provisions laid down by law,
regulation or administrative action in member States as directly affect the
establishment or functioning of the common market.
State parties to an international economic agreement may be required to
take similar steps, not only in respect to the initial agreement itself, but
also in relation to any norms of conduct subsequently adopted under it.
By resolution Number 90 adopted at the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) XVI Conference of June, 1968, member
states were requested to take steps to acquire a greater control over the
petroleum industry. Most member states of OPEC complied with this
request. 34
E. Procedures for the Adoption of International Economic Norms
Within Municipal Jurisdictions
An international economic agreement might not only require that its
provisions be introduced into the respective municipal legal systems of
party states, but also lay down detailed procedures for that purpose. For
example, under Article 54(1) of the International Civil Aviation Organi-
33. See GAT Panel Report on the responsibility under the GAT of the Canadian govern-
ment for taxation measures adopted by the Province of Ontario. L/5863, Sept. 17, 1985.
34. See Evans, Economic Policy and the Free Movement of Goods in EEC Law, 32 I.C.L.Q. 577
(1983); OPEC Res. No. XVI-op. For the purpose, Malaysia set up Petronas under the Petroleum
Development Act 1974, Kuwait took over the Kuwaiti National Petroleum Company by Law No. 8
of May 19, 1975, and Iraq established the Iraqi National Oil Company under art. XI of Law No. 123
of 1967.
1987]
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol65/iss4/17
854 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
zation (ICAO), the Council is authorized to adopt "international stan-
dards" and "recommended practices," contained in annexes to the
constitution, which are part of the constitutional law of the organization.
Members are obliged to conform with the "international standards"
while they are only required to endeavor to apply the "recommended
practices." Members are also expected to introduce suitable alterations
to their internal laws to comply with "international standards." Where
they do not do so they are bound to inform the council of this, and other
member states regain their discretion whether to abide by the "interna-
tional standards" in relation to the defaulting state.
Under the Constitution of the International Labour Organisation
(ILO) conventions are adopted by a majority of two thirds of the votes
cast by the delegates present. Conventions come into force after a certain
number of ratifications have been received. The ILO constitution places
a positive obligation on member states to present a duly adopted conven-
tion to their appropriate municipal authorities for the purpose of being
given effect within their respective municipal legal systems.35
F. Limitations Imposed on the Legislative Powers of States
Internationally agreed economic norms could operate as a restriction
on the legislative powers of a state. The Regulations of the Council and
Commission of the European Community have this effect. In 1967 the
Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ) observed that:
Regulation No. 22, which established the levy system is, according to Arti-
cle 189, binding in all its parts and directly applicable in all 'Member
States'. Such system, therefore, is applicable in all the Member States and
is equally binding within the framework of the Community legal order
which they established and which was, pursuant to the Treaty, incorpo-
rated into their legal systems. Thus, the Member States conferred upon the
Community institutions the power to issue levy measures such as those pro-
vided in Regulation No. 22, thereby limiting their sovereign rights
accordingly.36
The EEC Treaty has created its own legal order, having its own insti-
tutions, its own personality and its own capacity in law and it has been
said that the rights created by the Treaty cannot be contradicted by do-
35. ALEXANDROWICZ, LAW MAKING FUNCTIONS OF U.N. SPECIALISED AGENCIES 25 (1973).
36. Neumann v. Hauptzollamt Hof/Saale, 17/67, Dec. 13, 1967, 13 Rec. 571; see discussion in
Steiner, Direct Applicability of EEC Law - A Chameleon Concept, 98 L.Q.R. 229 (1982).
[Vol. 65:842
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mestic law:3 7 "No municipal laws, of whatever nature they may be, may
prevail over Community law ....
It is generally accepted that in the areas that the Council and the Com-
mission have been empowered to exercise legislative power under the
EEC Treaty, the member-states have surrendered their own legislative
powers to the Community:
Once, in relation to a particular subject, the conditions contained in a provi-
sion of the EEC Treaty conferring legislative power upon the institutions of
the Community are satisfied, the Governments of the Member States no
longer have the power to regulate the subject between themselves by means
of an agreement under international law (treaty, convention, protocol, act,
declaration, etc.). From that time on, the Community institutions have ex-
clusive competence to legislate on the subject in question. 39
G. Limitations on the Powers of Municipal Courts
It is also conceivable that states entering into an international agree-
ment would even consent to limit the competence of their own judicial
organs. Under Article IX (paragraphs 3, 4 and 6) of the IMF Agree-
ment, the assets of the Fund are immune from judicial process, attach-
ment or execution or other forms of restrictions or controls. This Article
is required to be given the force of law in all member states. Article 177
of the EEC Treaty states that:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the
Community;
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of
the Council, where those statues so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or Tribunal of a Mem-
ber State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision on the
question is necessary to enable it to give judgement, request the Court of
Justice to give a ruling thereon.
Where such a question is raised in a pending case before a court or tribu-
nal of a Member State, against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy
37. Costa v. ENEL, 1964 CMLR 425, 455 et seq; See Steiner supra note 36.
38. Simmenthal Case, 106/77 (1978 ECR 629).
39. Schwartz, Article 235 and Law-Making Powers in the European Community, 27 I.C.L.Q.
614, 615; See Pergola and Duca, Community Law, International Law and the Italian Constitution, 79
AM. J. INT'L L. 598 (1985).
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under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the
Court of Justice.
This provision is being resorted to with increasing regularity.
H. Limitations on Relations with Other States
An international agreement could also impose limits on a signatory
state's rights to enter into other international arrangements.
The GTCAEI states:
The signatory states agree not to sign unilaterally with non-Central Ameri-
can Countries, new treaties affecting the principles of Central American
Economic Integration. They shall also agree to maintain the Central
American exception clause in any trade agreements they may conclude on
the basis of most-favored-nation treatment with countries other than the
Contracting Parties.40
Thus it is clear that due to the expansion of the international economic
regimes, the economic sovereignty of states parties' has suffered consider-
able erosion. States have agreed to curtail their freedom of action relat-
ing to a wide array of economic activities including the regulation of
currencies, the restriction of imports, encouragement of exports, assist-
ance of production and the fostering of their own labor forces. These
limitations affect their right to adopt legislative and administrative meas-
ures, expect them to adopt new measures where necessary, require them
to act in consultation with each other, bind them to restrict the compe-
tence of their courts, or even curtail their right to enter freely into rela-
tions with other states. It is clear that with every new international
economic norm adopted, this process will advance further.
IV. INTRODUCTION OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC NORMS TO
MUNICIPAL LEGAL SYSTEMS
A. Some General Comments
Due to the widespread impact that international economic norms have
on domestic laws, regulations, customs, practices and institutions of indi-
vidual states, it is imperative that the will of the legislative organs of
states (and through them the will of individual members of society) play
some role4' in the acceptance and implementation within these states of
40. GTCAEI, Art. XXV. See also Schwartz, supra note 39.
41. In democracies the will of the individual is expressed for this purpose usually through his
representatives.
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such norms of conduct. After all, it is the latter's lives and livelihood
that will eventually be affected, and it will be the legislative, executive
and judicial organs of the state that will be responsible for ensuring their
due internal implementation. These factors may be acknowledged to a
greater or lesser extent by the draftsmen of international agreements and
national constitutions.
Most international economic agreements provide for their acceptance
and ratification to be subject to the constitutional and legal requirements
of the signatory states. Adherence to these requirements could be the
means for introducing such agreements, as well as subsequent norms of
conduct adopted under them, into the municipal legal systems of these
states. In other cases specific legislation may be required for this
purpose.
National constitutions also might stipulate specific procedures for the
acceptance and ratification of international agreements, and some might
even specifically refer to economic agreements. This could ensure that
unless the stipulated constitutional and other legal requirements were
complied with, any international norm to which a state became a party
would not have legal effect within that state.42
The frequency with which provisions of the above nature find their
way into contemporary international agreements might reflect an evolv-
ing state practice. If state practice could be said to result in the develop-
ment of the rules of international law, one is tempted to suggest that this
is illustrative of a nascent rule of international law - a rule which re-
quires that international economic norms be accepted and ratified by
states in accordance with their constitutional and legal requirements to
be effective in relation to such states.
It is important to remember, however, that some treaties make no ref-
erence to the need for them to be accepted and ratified in accordance
with the constitutional and other requirements of states. Yet, these trea-
ties continue to be concluded.
It is conceivable that a situation could arise where a country ratifies an
international agreement, but the legislature of that country refuses to en-
dorse the international act of its executive, and fails to take measures to
implement it within the domestic jurisdiction. The diplomatic embar-
rassment and the other consequences that could result from a situation of
42. It is emphasized that unless an international economic norm is given effect in the municipal
legal systems, it might very well become ineffective internationally as well.
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this nature may be avoided. The problem is circumvented if states be-
come party to international agreements on the basis of existing legislative
approval, or through signing on an ad referendum basis.
It appears possible for a state to adopt one of the following measures to
safeguard itself, and ensure the agreement's success domestically and
internationally:
(i) To specifically make international law part of the municipal law
of the State.
(ii) To obtain the requisite legislative approval prior to the executive
binding itself internationally.
(iii) To make the final effectiveness of its signature subject to legisla-
tive approval.
V. PROVISIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS ON
THEIR ACCEPTANCE AND RATIFICATION
The provisions of international economic agreements which require
their acceptance and ratification by states to be in accordance with the
constitutional and legal requirements of those states will also generally
apply to subsequent norms adopted under such agreements. Even states
that do not have such constitutional requirements to satisfy might accept
and ratify international economic accords after obtaining the approval of
their respective legislatures for the practical purpose of giving effect to
them within their municipal jurisdictions. For example, Britain enacted
the European Communities Act of 1872, in order to give effect to its obli-
gations arising from joining the EEC.
A. Specific Treaty Provisions
Treaty provisions on this point could be explicit. Article II of the
Agreement establishing the Asian Coconut Community states that: "This
Agreement shall be subject to ratification or acceptance by signatory gov-
ernments in accordance with their respective constitutional procedures."
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
Convention states in Article 14(a) that: "This Convention shall be rati-
fied or accepted by the Signatories in accordance with their respective
Constitutional requirements." A similar provision is contained in the
Treaty Establishing the CARICOM. Article 23 requires that:
This Treaty and any amendments thereto shall be subject to ratification by
the Contracting States in accordance with their respective constitutional
[Vol. 65:842
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procedures. Instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Secreta-
riat which shall transmit certified copies to the Government of each mem-
ber State.
Article 247 of the EEC Treaty stipulates that: "This Treaty shall be rati-
fied by the High Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective
constitutional requirements.
43
The GTCAEI employs a slightly different terminology. Article XXX
states that: "The Treaty shall be submitted for ratification by each State,
in conformity with its constitutional or legal procedures." This provision
would thus make it mandatory for States wishing to be parties to the
Agreement to comply with the requirements of any other legal proce-
dures, in the event that no specific Constitutional provisions exist, as a
condition to ratification.
Some agreements have gone to the extent of stipulating a similar re-
quirement for the purpose of accepting and ratifying amendments as
well. Article 96 of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)4
states that: "Such amendments shall enter into after being ratified by all
the Member States in accordance with their respective Constitutional
requirements."
The protocol amending the Montevideo Treaty (1969) in Article 10
states that:
The present protocol shall be called the Protocol of Caracas' and shall enter
into force as soon as all the Contracting Parties ratify it in accordance with
their legal procedures and deposit in the Secretariat of the Association the
respective instruments.
Thus, for an amendment or a protocol attached to an international
economic agreement to enter into force, it may be necessary for it to be
ratified in the same way as the original agreement. Likewise, a treaty of
an economic nature might require that any subsequent norms of conduct
adopted under it be ratified in accordande with the respective constitu-
tional and legal procedures of party states.
Article 31 of the Treaty establishing the CARICOM provides that:
2. Decisions taken under this Treaty requiring such action shall be subject
to the relevant constitutional procedures of the respective Member
States.
3. Where necessary, Member States undertake to take steps as expedi-
43. See also ECSC Treaty, Art. 99.
44. See also EEC Treaty, Art. 236.
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tiously as possible to give full effect in law to all decisions of the organs
and institutions of the Community which are binding on them.
The Treaty Establishing the Benelux Economic Union goes further
when it states in Article 19, paragraph (b) that:
In carrying out its appointed tasks the Committee of Ministers (b) may
draft conventions to be submitted to the High contracting Parties in order
that they may become operative in accordance with the rules of the Consti-
tution of each High Contracting Party.
The ILO has recognized the need to implement the conventions and
recommendations it sponsors within the municipal legal systems of mem-
ber states. It requires that members present the conventions and recom-
mendations to their respective legislative organs within a specified time
limit for adoption.45
Thus, a large number of international economic agreements have ac-
knowledged the need, not only for the agreements themselves, but also
for amendments to be duly accepted and ratified in accordance with the
constitutional and legal requirements of party states. In the case of the
Benelux Economic Union, the CARICOM, the EFTA, the EEC, the
ILO and the ICAO there is a positive obligation on member states to do
so even in the case of subsequently adopted norms of conduct. This is a
practical approach to adopt, as the acceptance and ratification of interna-
tional economic norms in accordance with the domestic constitutional
and legal procedures of the states concerned may have the result of giv-
ing effect to them within their domestic jurisdictions. Even if this by
itself does not have such an effect, it would be a useful step in the process
of doing so.
VI. PROVISIONS IN NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS RELATING TO THE
ACCEPTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
Just as treaties contain provisions relating to the need for their accept-
ance and ratification in accordance with the constitutional and legal re-
quirements of party states, numerous national constitutions also contain
specific provisions on their acceptance and ratification.
The task of negotiating and settling the texts of international agree-
ments is performed by the executive arm of government. Though the
final act necessary to bring an international agreement into force is per-
formed by the executive as well, it may be subject to the approval of the
45. See, ALEXANDEROWICZ, supra note 35.
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legislative arm of government. This act of approval, in most cases, will
also grant legal effect to an international agreement within the legal sys-
tem of a state party. (In some cases additional legislative or administra-
tive measures may be necessary for this purpose.) The intervention of the
legislature of a state in this process will also ensure a degree of popular
support for the agreement concerned - a factor which will assist in its
due implementation within the relevant municipal legal system.
It has been stated in England that when the Crown in the exercise of
its prerogative powers concludes a treaty, the subject gains no personal
rights under that treaty enforceable in the courts, unless the treaty has
become part of the municipal law of the country.4 6
The reason of the matter is to be found in the fact that in our constitutional
system treaties are matters for the Executive, involving the exercise of pre-
rogative power, whereas it is for Parliament, and not for the Executive, to
make or alter municipal laws.47
S.A. de Smith states in his Judicial Review of Administrative Action:4"
Again, neither a declaration nor any other judicial remedy is obtainable for
the purpose of ... securing performance of an international obligation un-
dertaken by the Crown unless the obligation has been incorporated into the
municipal law by statute.
The manner in which the approval of the legislature is obtained, for
the acceptance and ratification of international accords and for confer-
ring the status of law within the municipal jurisdictions of states, varies
from constitution to constitution.
A. United Arab Republic
The Constitution of the United Arab Republic (UAR) (1964) provided
in Article 125 that:
He (the President) concludes treaties and communicates them to the Na-
tional Assembly with suitable comments which have force of law after their
conclusion, ratification and publication. Peace treaties, commercial pacts
and maritime treaties, those involving modification in the territory or con-
nected with sovereignty and those involving charges not provided for in the
Budget require approval by the National Assembly before they come into
46. Rustomjee v. R. (1876) 1 QBD 487; Civilian War Claimants Association Ltd 1'. R. AC 14
(1932); Chow Hung Ching v. R. 77 CLR 449 (1948); Bradley v. Commonwealth 128 CLR 557 (1973);
Blackburn v. Attorney-General 1 WLR 1037 (1971); Laker Airways Ltd v. Department of Trade I
QBD 643 (1977).
47. See MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 328 (1973).
48. DE SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEw OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 499 (4th Ed. 1980).
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force. 49
The second passage refers to the need to obtain the approval of the
National Assembly before the types of treaties that are mentioned therein
come into force. It appears that this reference here is simply to such
treaties coming into force in the municipal law of the country. It is noted
that under the Constitution of 1964, agreements of an economic nature
are specifically required to be approved by the National Assembly in or-
der to become effective within the UAR.
It is difficult to see the purpose of an international economic agreement
concluded by the UAR, if it cannot be given effect within the country
itself. The international and internal effects of such agreements are inti-
mately linked to each other.
B Algeria
A different approach is adopted by the Constitution of Algeria. Arti-
cle 42 of the Algerian Constitution of 1963 states that the President is
empowered, after consultation with the National Assembly, to ratify and
put into operation treaties, conventions and international agreements.50
Here too, the power to enter into international agreements is conferred
on the executive i.e., the President. But he is required to consult the
legislature before ratifying and putting them into operation. In reality,
however, consultation with the legislature amounts to obtaining its
approval.
C. France
The position in France on this question is more stringent. Under Arti-
cle 52 of the Constitution of 1958 the President is empowered to negoti-
ate and ratify, and is entitled to be informed of all negotiations leading to
the conclusion of international agreements not subject to ratification.
This all-encompassing power of the President is curtailed by Article 53,
which states that:
Peace treaties, commercial treaties, treaties or agreements relating to inter-
national organizations, those that imply a commitment for the finances of
the State, those that modify provisions of a legislative nature, those relating
to the status of persons, those that call for the cession, exchange or addition
of territory may be ratified or approved only by a law.
49. HOLLOWAY, MODERN TRENDS IN TREATY LAW 199 (1967).
50. Id. at 208.
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It is provided that the above shall become effective only after they have
been ratified and approved in the stated manner. In fact, French Courts
have tended to recognize only those treaties which have been published
in the form of a presidential decree.51
Article 11 of the Constitution states that:
The President of the Republic, upon proposition by the government during
parliamentary session or upon proposition by the two Assemblies published
in the Official Journal, may submit to referendum any Bill on the organiza-
tion of public powers, on the approval of an agreement with the Commu-
nity or providing for authorization to ratify a treaty which, without being
contrary to the Constitution, might affect the functioning of (existing)
institutions.
It is apparent that, although the French Constitution confers the
power of concluding treaties on the executive arm of government, it also
reserves a considerable role for the legislature.
The discretion that Article 11 confers on the President may in fact be
no discretion at all. When one considers the whole democratic process,
with the need to consult the electorate at regular intervals, particularly
on matters that closely affect the electorate (and due to the impact that
an international economic norm could have on it) it might even be possi-
ble to suggest that a norm ratified contrary to the above provisions, in
addition to lacking any effectiveness within the country, might be ren-
dered ineffective internationally, at least in relation to France. For exam-
ple, if the French government is unable to implement a Decision of the
Council of the EEC within the country, not only will the Council be
largely incapable of effectively enforcing that Decision in the case of
France, the Decision itself might become internationally ineffective.
D. Belgium
The Belgium Constitution also deals with this matter. Article 68 states
that: "The King makes peace treaties, treaties of alliance and com-
merce." The King is required to inform the Chambers and submit all
relevant communications to them as soon as the interests and the secur-
ity of the State permit him to do so. Treaties of commerce and those
involving the national finances or those imposing financial burdens upon
Belgian citizens require the consent of the Chambers to become effective.
51. See Veuve Ultimas Ben Mohammed v. Sanchis et la Zurich, ANNUAL DIGEST, 347 (1931-
32); Bial, Some Recent French Decisions on the Relationship Between Treaties and Municipal Law, 49
AM. J. INT'L. L. 347 (1955).
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The need to obtain the consent of the legislature in the case of the latter
type of agreement is enshrined in the Belgian Constitution. The actual
position of Belgium has been explained in an official memo of the Belgian
Government to the United Nations in the following words:
It follows from the (above) provisions that the conclusion of international
conventions is a prerogative of the executive power by the King under the
responsibility of a minister.
When the consent of the Chambers is required for the convention to be-
come effective, the ratification by the Head of State does not generally inter-
vene until after that consent has been obtained, merely to avoid deadlock.
(However, such approval) is not necessary in international law, and in cer-
tain urgent cases, treaties have been ratified before their approval by the
Chambers.52
Though Article 68 gives rise to some doubt, the actual practice of the
State of Belgium indicates that legislative approval of a treaty concluded
by Belgium is obtained as a means of ensuring compliance with munici-
pal law requirements. This has repercussions, however, on its interna-
tional effectiveness.
E. United States
The position in the United States is governed by Article 6 Clause 2 of
the Constitution which empowers the President to make treaties by and
with the advice of the Senate provided that two-thirds of the Senators
present concur. American Courts have tended to define the term
"treaty" with reference to U.S. domestic law.53 The lack of Senate ap-
proval may not affect the international validity of a "treaty" but would
affect its validity with the country.54 Article 6 Clause 2 of the Constitu-
tion also makes treaties part of the law of the State.
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in
pursuance thereof: and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
The Administration will not attempt to ratify a "treaty" that has not
52. U.N. Compilation, P. 14 at 15-16; see Institute National des Appellations d'Origine des Vins
et Eaux-de- Vie v. Mettes N.J., 424 (1958): 584 I.L.R. (1957).
53. See Mathews, The Constitutional Power of the President to Conclude International Agree-
ments 64 Y.L.J. 345 et seq. (1955); U.N. Compilation, at 125 et seq.
54. See HOLLOWAY, supra note 49, at 219 et seq.; Glennon, The Senate Role in Treaty Ratifica-
tion 77 AM. J. INT'L.L. 257 (1983).
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been approved by the Senate. Marshall C.J. stated in the celebrated case
of Foster v. Neilson that:
A treaty is in its nature a contract between two nations, not a Legislative
Act. It does not generally effect, of itself, the object to be accomplished,
especially so far as its operation is intraterritorial; but is carried into execu-
tion by the sovereign power of the respective parties to the instrument.
In the United States a different principle is established. Our Constitution
declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, consequently to be re-
garded in Courts of Justice as equivalent to an Act of the Legislature, when-
ever it operates of itself without the aid of any legislative provision. But
when the terms of the stipulation import a contract - when either of the
parties engages to perform a particular act - the treaty addresses itself to the
political, not the judicial department; and the Legislature must execute the
contract before it can become a rule for the Court.55
The Supreme Court of California has stated with regard to the United
Nations Charter that:
The provisions in the charter pledging cooperation in promoting observance
of fundamental freedoms lack the mandatory quality and definiteness which
would indicate an intent to create justifiable rights in private persons imme-
diately upon ratification. Instead, they are framed as a promise of future
action by the member nations.56
The United States constitutional model in this respect has been fol-
lowed in Article 22 of the 1949 Constitution of Argentina, in Article 7 of
the 1946 Constitution of Korea, in Article 133 of the 1917 Constitution
of Mexico and Article 26 of the 1940 Constitution of Paraguay.
The United States had to abandon the International Trade Organiza-
tion (ITO) Charter (thus ensuring that it would not come into effect) as
there appeared to be no possibility of obtaining the consent of the Sen-
ate.57 In the case of the United States, the requirements for ensuring
legal validity of a treaty within the country appear to be so closely inter-
twined with the requirements for granting international effectiveness to
it. Thus it might be possible to suggest that the two are interdependent.
The administration has to an extent circumvented the need for Senate
approval for international agreements by developing the practice of con-
cluding executive agreements. Executive agreements are binding under
international law (i.e., they are of treaty status) but are not required to be
55. 27 U.S. (2 Pet) 253, 314 (1892).
56. Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952).
57. GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY 378 (1956).
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submitted for the approval of the Senate. They are said to gain their
validity under the Constitutional provisions which authorize the Presi-
dent to conduct foreign relations.58
However, legislative control over executive agreements has been ex-
tended to some extent through the provisions of the Case-Zablocki Act. 9
This Act, while authorizing the promulgation of implementing regula-
tions requires the Secretary of State to transmit the texts of all interna-
tional agreements; other than treaties, to the Congress no later than 60
days after their entry into force. The Act also provides that no interna-
tional agreement may be signed or otherwise concluded on behalf of the
United States without prior consultation with the Secretary of State.
The type of agreement that is required to be transmitted to the Con-
gress under the Case-Zablocki Act would have the following
characteristics:
The Parties to such agreements must be states, state agencies or intergov-
ernmental organizations; they must intend such agreements to be legally
binding and not merely of political or personal effect; such agreements
should be intended to be governed by international law; and they should
not deal with minor or trivial matters.
Most international agreements of a commercial or economic nature
would require transmission to the Congress under the Case-Zablocki Act.
Although unlike "Treaties", executive agreements do not require the ap-
proval of Congress prior to their conclusion. The requirement to trans-
mit them to Congress, and the powers of Congress relating to their
implementation within the country would translate into a form of effec-
tive legislative control.
F. United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, the Crown, by virtue of the royal Prerogative,
issues Full Powers for the negotiation and signature of treaties and ulti-
mately ratifies them where necessary. Lord McNair states that:
Accordingly, if the Crown enters into a treaty which is likely to come into
question in a Court of Law or to require for its enforcement the assistance
of a Court of Law, and the application and enforcement of that treaty in-
58. United States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp. 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Jackson, U.S. Law and
Implementation of the Tokyo Round Negotiation, in JACKSON, Louis & MATSUSHITA, IMPLEMENT-
ING THE TOKYO ROUND: NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RULES
140-41 (1984).
59. 1 U.S.C. 112(b); see also 46 Fed. Reg. 35917 (July 13, 1981).
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volves any modification of or addition to the rules of law administered by
an English Court (which include the rules of international law as under-
stood and ascertained by English Courts), the Crown must induce Parlia-
ment to pass the necessary legislation, for it is only Parliament that can
change the law binding upon a treaty which merely creates a particular
obligation between the parties, or upon a treaty which purports to create
new rules of international law binding upon a number of parties. 6°
It is not only treaties that are required to be introduced into the munici-
pal law of Britain through the intervention of the legislature, but subse-
quent norms of conduct adopted by international organizations of which
Britain is a member.6 'Lord Denning has stated: "In my opinion, the
rules of international law only become part of law insofar as they are
accepted and adopted by us."
62
In Britain there is no stated requirement that international norms of
conduct, to which the U.K. has become a party, be accepted or ratified in
accordance with any constitutional and legal requirements. However,
the practical situation resulting from the need to enforce such norms
with the assistance of the administrative and judicial organs makes it
necessary for them to be introduced into the domestic legal system with
the assistance of the legislature. It appears that a large number of eco-
nomic and commercial agreements concluded by the U.K. would require
the assistance of Parliament if they are to be given full effect.
G. Australia
The position in Australia is generally similar to the position in Britain.
In the course of his judgement in Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen Mason J.
stated that:
It is a well settled principle of the common law that a treaty not terminating
a state of war has no legal effect upon the rights and duties of Australian
citizens and is not incorporated into Australian law on its ratification by
Australia. In this respect Australian law differs from that of the United
States where treaties are self-executing and create rights and liabilities with-
out the need for legislation by Congress (Foster v. Neilson (1829), 2 Pet. 253
at p. 314; 27 U.S. 164, at p. 202). As Barwick C.J. and Gibbs J. observed
in Bradley (at pp. 582-583), the approval by the Commonwealth Parliament
60. McNair, The Method Whereby International Law Is Made to Prevail in Municipal Courts on
an Issue ofInternational Law 20 TR. GROTIUS SOC. 11, 19 (1945).
61. McNAIR, LAw OF TREATIES Ch. IV (1961).
62. R. v. Secretary of State, ex parte Thakrar, Q.B.D. 684 at 701 (1974); 1 ALL E.R. 415
(1974).
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of the Charter of the United Nations Act 1945 (Cth) did not incorporate the
provisions of the Charter into Australian law. To achieve this result the
provisions have to be enacted as part of our domestic law whether by Com-
monwealth or State statute.63
In Australia the Constitution empowers the legislature "to make laws
for the peace, order and good government of the Commonwealth with
respect to... external affairs.6 In the exercise of this power, Parliament
could legislate to give domestic law effect to an international agreement
concluded by Australia.65 It is the usual practice in Australia to have the
necessary domestic legislation in place, prior to entering into any interna-
tional agreement. Since the commitment made by Prime Minister Men-
zies in 1961, it has been the Australian practice to lay on the table of both
Houses, the texts of treaties already signed and treaties to which Austra-
lia was contemplating accession, or treaties that Australia was consider-
ing ratifying.
H. Canada
In Canada, the executive has the power to conclude treaties without
formally seeking the approval of the Parliament. However, as a matter of
practice Parliamentary approval is sought prior to entering into certain
important agreements. Gotlieb suggests that in practice, Parliamentary
approval is sought for four types of agreements: i.e.,
i. agreements imposing military or economic sanctions;
ii. agreements involving large expenditures of public funds or impor-
tant financial or economic implications;
iii. agreements of political significance; and
iv. agreements which affect private rights within Canada.66
Most Treaties are tabled in Parliament by way of notification. Parlia-
mentary approval of the conclusion of a treaty, however, does not result
in the introduction of the provisions of such a treaty into the domestic
law of Canada. This would require specific implementing legislation.
Due to the division of powers under the Canadian Constitution between
the federal and provincial governments and the effect of judicial interpre-
63. 56 A.L.J.R. 625, 648 (1982).
64. Australian Constitution, Art. 51 (xxix).
65. The Commonwealth and Another v. The State of Tasmania and Another 57 A.L.J.R. 450
(1983); Byrns and Charlesworth, Federalism and International Legal Order: Recent Developments
in Australia 79 AM. J. INT'L. L. 622 (1985).
66. GOTLIEB, CANADIAN TREATY-MAKING 16-17 (1968).
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tations,67 the Canadian government either obtains the prior concurrence
of the provinces, or ensures the incorporation of an appropriate "federal-
states clause" before concluding international agreements. 61 Most inter-
national agreements affecting economic matters to which Canada is a
party require to be given effect by both federal and provincial legislation
or by provincial legislation alone.69
I. Japan
In Japan the executive has the power to conclude treaties. Under Arti-
cle 73 of the Constitution:
The Cabinet, in addition to other general administrative responsibilities,
shall perform the following functions: ... conclude treaties. However, it
shall obtain the prior or, depending on circumstances, subsequent approval
of the Diet...
In Japanese practice "treaties," which relate to the legislative power of
the Diet, which impose financial obligations on Japan (except those pre-
viously authorized by the Diet in the budget or in other laws), and which
are politically important, are required to be submitted to the Diet for
approval.
The practice of concluding international agreements, called "executive
agreements" has developed where the content of such compacts are au-
thorized by the budget or existing laws. Executive agreements are of
treaty status but are not referred to as treaties. These need not be ap-
proved by the Diet.
J. India
The Indian Constitution states that: "..all executive action of the
Government of India shall be expressly taken in the name of the
President."7
It would appear from the above that national constitutional provisions
which require legislative approval to be obtained prior to the acceptance
and/or ratification of treaties are common. Even countries (e.g. Britain)
that have no such legal requirements appear to do so in practice, in the
67. Laskin, Comment (1056) 34 CAN. BAR REV. 215; Legault, Canadian Practice in Interna-
tional Law During 1982 at the Department of External Affairs 21 CAN. BAR REV. 302, 309 (1983);
McDonald v. Vapor 139 D.L.R. (3d) 417 (S.C.C.) (1983).
68. See, Legault, supra note 67.
69. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 440 (2d. ed. 1985).
70. Indian Constitution, Art. 77(1).
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case of major international economic agreements. In some countries it
might be necessary to take additional measures in order to give specific
effect to international norms within their municipal jurisdictions. This is
particularly important in the case of international economic norms as
they are required to be implemented within municipal jurisdictions if
they are to have full effect.
International economic agreements affect not only inter-state relations,
but they also affect intimately the lives of individuals within the state, its
municipal legal system and sovereign powers of the state.71 For example,
the impact of commodity agreements, which are extremely comprehen-
sive in the manner in which they regulate the commodity trade, is felt by
a large number of persons in the states which are party to them. These
persons include small producers, large combines, traders, middlemen, re-
tailers, wholesalers, exporters, persons providing various services and the
organs of the state. Consequently, legislative approval becomes essential
for them to be given effect within municipal legal systems. Unless they
are given effect internally, they might be rendered ineffective internation-
ally as well. For example, if Brazil does not give effect to the Interna-
tional Coffee Agreement and Brazilian producers and exporters do not
adhere to its regulatory regime, not only will the Coffee Council find it
difficult to enforce the provisions of the Agreement with regard to Brazil,
the Agreement itself might become ineffective internationally. This illus-
trates the proximity of the relationship between the international effec-
tiveness of an international economic norm and its municipal law
effectiveness. Given this background, it would be unproductive for a
state to accept or ratify an international economic agreement without
first obtaining the approval of its own legislative organ, or having the
assurance of getting that approval later. This act of approval, by itself,
could confer legal effectiveness to an international norm within the mu-
71. "The Joint Committee doubts if the general public or even parliamentarians appreciate the
extent to which Community law which governs activities in the field of trade, industry, transport,
agriculture and services is continuously being incorporated into our legal system either directly or
through the agency of statutory instruments made by Ministers." Fifty-fifth Report of the First
Joint Committee of the Irish Parliament. Prl. 6169 at 9; see Seidle-Hohenveldern, Transformation or
Adoption of International Law into Municipal Law 12 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 88, 105 (1963); see also
Seidle-Hohenveldern 49 AM. J. INT'L.L. 451, 465 (1955); see also Sorensen, Autonomous Legal Or-
ders: Some Considerations Relating to System Analysis of International Organisations in the World
Legal Order 32 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 559 (1982); Evans, Freedom of Trade Under the Common Law
and European Community Law: The Case of the Football Bans 102 L.Q.R. 510, 546 (1986).
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nicipal jurisdiction of a state or the legislature will have to enact specific
legislation for that purpose.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The steady growth of a web of international economic norms, designed
to regulate various common aspects of international economic relations,
has caused a gradual decline of the powers of sovereign states in certain
areas - particularly in relation to economic matters. This has wide im-
plications for states, both internationally and domestically.
On the one hand, along with the reduction of the states' powers in an
individual sense, their ability to participate in and influence the interna-
tional economic regulatory systems has been increasing. (Of course, the
ability to influence international power systems would depend to a large
extent on the economic might of each state).
On the other hand, a parallel and necessary development has been the
increasingly proximate relationship that has evolved between the imple-
mentation of international economic norms internationally, and their im-
plementation within municipal legal systems. Due to the extensive
impact such norms are intended to have, they must be meticulously im-
plemented both internationally and within individual states. As imple-
mentation within domestic jurisdictions is accomplished through the
medium of the internal administrative and judicial organs, and because
they would only enforce norms that are acceptable to their own munici-
pal legal systems, international economic norms must be duly introduced
to the municipal legal systems of these states in accordance with their
preordained constitutional and legal requirements. Where no such re-
quirements exist, they may have to be given effect by the adoption of
other legislative and administrative measures. The role of the national
legislatures in this respect appears to be increasingly acknowledged in
international economic agreements and national constitutions that re-
quire such agreements to be accepted and ratified (and/or given effect to)
in accordance with the constitutional and legal procedures of party
states. (Thus ensuring legislative endorsement for the international acts
of the respective executives.) In most cases, unless such international
economic norms are duly implemented within the municipal jurisdictions
of relevant states, they would become ineffective.
One is tempted to suggest that this interdependence between the effec-
tiveness of international economic norms within domestic jurisdictions
and in the international sphere should now be acknowledged by interna-
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tional law. Accordingly, only an international economic norm that has
been accepted (or ratified) in accordance with a state's domestic constitu-
tional or legal requirements, or in relation to which domestic measures of
implementation have been taken in accordance with the law, should be
deemed to be binding on that state at international law.
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